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This paper argues that an increased application of quasi-experimental and experimental 
techniques will improve understanding about core environmental economics questions.  This 
argument is supported by a review of the limitations of associational evidence in assessing causal 
hypotheses.  The paper also discusses the benefits of experiments and quasi-experiments, 
outlines some quasi-experimental methods, and highlights threats to their validity.  It then 
illustrates the quasi-experimental method by assessing the validity of a quasi-experiment that 
aims to estimate the impact of the Endangered Species Act on property markets in North 
Carolina.  The paper’s larger argument is that greater application of experimental and quasi-
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Externalities are at the center of environmental economics.1  A classic example is a 
factory’s release of air pollution as a byproduct of its production of a marketable good.  The air 
pollution may negatively impact human health, for example by raising mortality rates, but 
abatement raises the firm’s production costs.  The social problem is that firms do not internalize 
the health costs they impose on others through the release of air pollution.  High transaction costs 
frequently prevent the affected parties from reaching an efficient solution that accounts for the 
cost and benefits [22].  In these cases, government interventions (e.g., emissions taxes or limits) 
can be used to achieve the level of air pollution reduction that maximizes net benefits.2  
Successful interventions, however, require estimates of the costs and benefits of environmental 
quality.   
However, environmental policy that is not based on credible empirical research can lead 
to inefficient policies or even policies with negative net benefits.  An example of the dangers of 
using unreliable empirical research concerns the recent use of estrogen replacement therapy 
(ERT) to mitigate the symptoms of menopause, such as hot flashes and night sweats.  In the 
1980s, a series of observational studies concluded that ERT did not lead to a higher rate of heart 
disease and that, if anything, it may decrease the incidence of heart disease.  Based on these 
studies, ERT was widely recommended for menopausal women nationwide.  Some researchers 
noted their concern with the ability of these studies to control for unobservable determinants of 
heart disease; after all, there are many reasons to believe that those receiving ERT had a healthier 
lifestyle than those who did not.  A randomized study was finally conducted in the 1990s and 
was stopped three years early because the results clearly indicated that ERT substantially 
increased the incidence of heart disease.  Millions of women had received poor medical advice 
due to a policy based on associational evidence [51]. 
The evidence in support of the vast majority of environmental policies is associational in 
nature.  It is therefore possible that many environmental policies fail to achieve their stated goals 
or fail to do so efficiently. 
This paper’s argument is that one of the frontiers of environmental economics is to 
improve the measurement of the costs and benefits of environmental quality.  We contend that 
the best way forward is to use quasi-experimental and experimental techniques that aim to 
identify exogenous variation in the variable of interest.  Over the last two decades, these 
approaches have become widely accepted in other subfields of economics (e.g., labor, public 
finance, and development economics).  Further, we believe that environmental economics is 
flush with opportunities to apply these techniques.   
The successful application of quasi-experimental and experimental techniques offers the 
promise of providing a deeper understanding of the world in which we live.  Furthermore, they 
can lead to the identification of social welfare maximizing environmental policies, which is the 
aim of much of environmental economics. 
This paper proceeds as follows.  Section I discusses the nature of causal hypotheses, 
reviews the standard approaches to estimating causal relationships with observational data, and 
presents some evidence on the reliability of these approaches.  Section II discusses the benefits 
of experiments and quasi-experiments, outlines some quasi-experimental methods, highlights 
some threats to their validity, and discusses their usefulness for answering important questions.  
Section III illustrates some of the challenges and issues with implementing a quasi-experiment 
by assessing the validity of a quasi-experiment that aims to estimate the impact of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) on property markets in North Carolina.  Due to space constraints 
 2
and current data limitations, a full-scale evaluation is left for future research.  
 
I. Causal Hypotheses and Associational Evidence 
The main focus of environmental economics is to address inefficiencies caused by 
externalities.  The usefulness of any policy prescriptions stemming from this approach rests 
squarely on the reliability of the empirical estimates of the benefits and costs of reducing 
pollution.3  Therefore, it is important to understand the validity of the different empirical 
approaches to estimating the causal relationships between economic activity and externalities. 
 
A. Causal Hypotheses and the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference 
The development of reliable estimates of the costs and benefits of environmental quality 
necessarily begins with the specification of a causal hypothesis or hypotheses.  The key features 
of a causal hypothesis are that it contains a manipulable treatment that can be applied to a subject 
and an outcome that may or may not respond to the treatment.  For a causal hypothesis to have 
any practical relevance, it is necessary to be able to subject it to a meaningful test.  Such a test 
requires that all other determinants of the outcome can be held constant so that the effect of the 
treatment can be isolated.4    
In the ideal it would be feasible to simultaneously observe the same “subject” in the 
states of the world where it received the treatment and did not receive the treatment.  This would 
guarantee that all else is held constant.  Of course, it is impossible to observe the same subject in 
both states simultaneously.  For example, in drug trials the new drug cannot simultaneously be 
administered to, and withheld from, the same person.  This difficulty is labeled the “Fundamental 
Problem of Causal Inference” and has been recognized since at least Hume [46].   
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More formally, it is instructive to borrow from Rubin’s [70] terminology of a potential 
outcome.  Consider the case where we are interested in measuring the impact of exposure to high 
levels of air pollution on human health.  For ease of exposition, we assume that pollution 
exposure is dichotomous and there are either high or low levels of air pollution exposure.  We 
denote the health outcome for a treated person i (i.e., someone exposed to high pollution level) as 
Y1i and the health outcome for that same person as Y0i if she is not treated (i.e., she is exposed to 
low pollution levels).  The i subscript indexes individuals.  The object of interest is Y1i – Y0i, 
which is the effect of exposure to high pollution levels, relative to low levels.   
Since Y1i – Y0i is not constant across individuals, it is standard to focus on average 
effects.  For clarity, we let D represent treatment status, where D=1 designates that a person was 
treated and D=0 indicates that person was not treated.  Thus, we would like to know E[Y1i – Y0i | 
Di=1], which is the average causal effect of exposure to high pollution concentrations among the 
treated (i.e., the treatment on the treated).  It is evident that the Fundamental Problem of Causal 
Inference binds here, because it is impossible to observe the same individual simultaneously 
exposed to high and low pollution concentrations.  Put another way, every individual has two 
potential outcomes but only one is observed. 
In practice, we are faced with situations where some individuals have received the 
treatment and others have not.  In this case, we can estimate a treatment effect  
(1)  T = E[Y1i | Di=1] - E[Y0i | Di=0].   
By adding and subtracting the unobserved quantity E[Y0i | Di=1], which is the expected outcome 
for treated individuals if they had not received the treatment, we can write: 
(2)  T = E[Y1i - Y0i | Di=1] +{E[Y0i | Di=1] - E[Y0i | Di=0]}. 
The first term is the average causal effect of exposure to pollution and is the quantity of 
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interest.  The second term is the selection bias that plagues the successful estimation of average 
causal effects.  It measures the difference in potential untreated outcomes between the 
individuals that did and did not receive the treatment.  This term could be non-zero for a 
multitude of reasons.  For example, Chay and Greenstone [21] have shown that residents of 
heavily polluted areas tend to have low incomes and that the poor may also have greater health 
problems.  In the case where Y represents a negative health outcome (e.g., mortality), this would 
mean that the selection bias term is positive.  In general, it is difficult to predict the direction and 
magnitude of selection bias. 
The challenge for credible empirical research is to identify settings where it is valid to 
assume that the selection bias term is zero or where it can be controlled for. We now turn to a 
discussion of the standard approach to solving this problem.   
 
B. The “Selection on Observables” Approach 
The typical way to learn about the validity of a causal hypothesis is to use observational 
data to fit regression models.5  For example, consider the following cross-sectional model for 
county-level infant mortality rates in year t which is based on [20]: 
(3) Yct = Xct′β + θΤct + εct, εct = αc + uct, and 
(4) Tct = Xct′Π + ηct,  ηct = λc + vct. 
Here Yct is the infant mortality rate in county c in year t, Xct is a vector of observed determinants 
of Y, and Tct is again a dichotomous variable that indicates exposure to high or low pollution in 
the county.  εct and ηct are the unobservable determinants of health status and air pollution levels, 
respectively.  Each is composed of a fixed and transitory component.  The coefficient θ is the 
“true” effect of air pollution on measured health status.  The specification of equation (4) 
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demonstrates that the determinants of health status, Xct, may also be associated with air pollution. 
For consistent estimation, the least squares estimator of θ requires that E[εctηct] = 0.  If 
this assumption is valid, the estimated θ will provide a causal estimate of the effect of air 
pollution on health status.  However, if there are omitted permanent (αc and λc) or transitory (uct 
and vct) factors that covary with both air pollution and health status, then the cross-sectional 
estimator will be biased.  Poorer individuals tend to live in more polluted areas, so it is apparent 
that income and perhaps income changes are potential confounders.  Further, equation (3) 
assumes a particular functional form for the explanatory variables.  In practice, the true 
functional form is unknown and the incorrect specification of the functional form may be an 
additional source of misspecification.  
Another source of omitted variables bias is that air pollution may cause individuals who 
are susceptible to its influences to engage in unobserved (to the econometrician) compensatory 
behavior to mitigate its impact on their health.  For example, people with respiratory diseases 
might migrate from polluted to clean areas to avoid the health effects of air pollution or install 
filters (or other devices) in their homes that clean the air they breathe.  These compensatory 
behavioral responses to pollution will bias the estimates downward.  The basic problem is that it 
is in people’s interests to protect themselves against pollution, but these efforts undermine our 
ability to obtain structural estimates of the effects of pollution on health.     
The data sources on pollution introduce two potential sources of bias.  First, it is 
generally impossible to construct measures of individuals’ lifetime exposure to air pollution.  
This is problematical if human health is a function of lifetime exposure to pollution.  Since 
historical data on individual’s exposure to pollution is generally impossible to obtain, scores of 
studies on adult mortality rely on the assumption that current measures of air pollution 
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concentrations accurately characterize past levels. 
The available pollution data introduce a second bias.  In particular, most cities have only 
a few pollution monitors.  The readings from these monitors are used to develop measures of 
individuals’ true exposure to air pollution.  Since there is frequently great variation within cities 
in pollution concentrations and individuals spend varying amounts of time inside and outside, 
substantial measurement error in individuals’ exposures is likely.  In general, measurement error 
attenuates the estimated coefficient in regressions, and the degree of attenuation is increasing in 
the fraction of total variation in observed pollution that is due to mismeasurement.6   
The more general problem with the approach is that it will only produce estimates of T’s 
causal impact on Y if two assumptions hold.  The first assumption is that after conditioning on a 
vector of observable variables, X, the treatment is “ignorable”.  This is often referred to as the 
“selection on observables” assumption.  Returning to the notation from the previous subsection, 
this assumption implies that after conditioning on X the selection bias term is irrelevant because 
E[Y0i | Di=1, X] - E[Y0i | Di=0, X] = 0.   
The second assumption is that it is necessary to assume that T causes Y, rather than Y 
causes T.  This assumption is necessary because this approach does not rely on a manipulation of 
T preceding the observation of Y.  So, for example, in equation (3) Y could precede T, T could 
precede Y, or they could occur simultaneously.  In contrast, a classical experiment is structured 
so that T precedes the realization of Y.  Even when this is the case, it is still necessary to assume 
that T causes Y (rather than Y causes T), because this approach does not rely on a manipulation 
of T preceding the observation of Y.   
 There are three primary ways to operationalize the “selection on observables” approach.  
The first method is to fit the linear regression outlined in equation (3).  The second is to match 
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treatment and control observations with identical values of all of the components of the X 
vector.7  This method is almost always infeasible when there are many variables or even a few 
continuous variables, because it becomes impossible to obtain matches across the full set of 
characteristics.   
The third approach offers a solution to this “curse of dimensionality”.  Specifically, 
Rosenbaum and Rubin [69] suggest matching on the propensity score—the probability of 
receiving the treatment conditional on the vector X.  This probability is an index of all covariates 
and effectively compresses the multi-dimensional vector of covariates into a simple scalar.  The 
advantage of the propensity score approach is that it offers the promise of providing a feasible 
method to control for the observables in a more flexible manner than is possible with linear 
regression.8   
 All of these methods share a faith in the selection on observables assumption, which 
implies that unobservable variables do not covary with both air pollution and health status.  Of 
course, this assumption is untestable because the unobservables are by their very nature 
unobservable.  In the case of OLS specifications, this is sometimes referred to as “OLS and hope 
for the best”.  Indeed, there is a growing consensus in many applied microeconomic fields that 
the selection on observables assumption is unlikely to be valid in most settings [56, 3].  It seems 
reasonable to assume that environmental economics is no exception, and we provide evidence of 
this in the next subsection.   
  
C. The Quality of the Evidence from the Selection on Observables Approach 
Here, we present some examples based on key environmental economics questions of the 
quality of evidence produced by the selection on observables approach.  Specifically, we assess 
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the sensitivity of the results to changes in the sample and in the set of conditioning covariates.  
We begin by borrowing from Chay and Greenstone [20], which examines the relationship 
between ambient concentrations of total suspended particulates (TSPs) and infant mortality.   
That paper presents evidence of the reliability of using a cross-sectional approach to test the 
causal hypothesis that TSPs exposure causes elevated infant mortality rates.  While our focus for 
now is on the difficulties of estimating the health effects of externalities, the implications equally 
apply to studies of the valuation of externalities (e.g., hedonic analyses) and to studies of the 
costs of remediating or abating externalities [36, 21].   
Table I presents regression estimates of the effect of TSPs on the number of internal 
infant deaths within a year of birth per 100,000 live births for each cross-section from 1969-
1974.  (“Internal deaths” are those due to health reasons, in contrast to death due to external, 
non-health reasons such as accidents and homicides.9)  The entries report the coefficient on TSPs 
and its standard error (in parentheses).  Column 1 presents the unadjusted TSPs coefficient; 
column 2 adjusts flexibly for the rich set of natality variables available from the birth certificate 
data files and controls for per-capita income, earnings, employment, and transfer payments by 
source; and column 3 adds state fixed effects.10  The sample sizes and R2s of the regressions are 
shown in brackets. 
 There is wide variability in the estimated effects of TSPs, both across specifications for a 
given cross-section and across cross-sections for a given specification.  While the raw 
correlations in column 1 are all positive, only those from the 1969 and 1974 cross-sections are 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  Including the controls in column 2 reduces the 
point estimates substantially, even as the precision of the estimates increases due to the greatly 
improved fit of the regressions.  In fact, 4 of the 7 estimates are now negative or perversely 
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signed, and the only statistically significant estimate (from 1972 data) is perversely signed in that 
it indicates that TSPs reduce IMR.  The most unrestricted specification in column 3 that also 
adjusts for state fixed effects produces two statistically significant estimates but one is positive 
and the other is negative. 
 The largest positive estimates from the cross-sectional analyses imply that a 1-μg/m3 
reduction in mean TSPs results in roughly 3 fewer internal infant deaths per 100,000 live births.  
This is an elasticity of 0.14 and is broadly consistent with published estimates.   
However, there is little evidence of a systematic cross-sectional association between 
particulates pollution and infant survival rates.  While the 1974 cross-section produces estimates 
that are positive, significant and slightly less sensitive to specification, the 1972 cross-section 
provides estimates that are routinely negative.  It is troubling that before looking at these results, 
there is no reason to believe that the 1974 data are more likely to produce a valid estimate than 
the 1972 data.  The sensitivity of the results to the year analyzed and the set of variables used as 
controls suggests that omitted variables may play an important role in cross-sectional analysis.  
We conclude that the cross-sectional approach is unreliable in this setting. 
Another example of the sensitivity of estimates in the selection on observables approach 
comes from a study of the impacts of climate change on agricultural land values by Deschenes 
and Greenstone [26].  This paper reports 36 cross-sectional estimates of the predicted changes in 
land values from the benchmark estimates of climate change induced increases of 5 degrees 
Fahrenheit in temperatures and 8% in precipitation.  The different estimates are derived from six 
years of data and six separate specifications.  These estimates along with their +/- 1 standard 
error range are reported in Figure 1.  The figure makes clear that there is a large amount of 
variability across specifications, and the variability extends across the range of positive and 
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negative land value effects.  In fact, the estimated changes in agricultural land values range from 
-$200 billion (2002$) to $320 billion or -18% to 29%.  It is evident from this example too that 
that the cross-sectional associational approach to uncovering key relationships in environmental 
economics may be prone to producing unreliable estimates. 
In our view, these two cases are not isolated incidents and associational evidence 
frequently provides mixed and/or unreliable evidence on the nature of causal relationships.  In 
these cases, the temptation is to rely on one’s prior beliefs which may not have a scientific 
origin.  In his classic 1944 article, “The Probability Approach in Econometrics,” Trygve 
Haavelmo described this problem of testing theories for which an experiment is unavailable, “we 
can make the agreement or disagreement between theory and the facts depend upon two things: 
the facts we choose to consider, as well our theory about them” [40, p. 14].     
 
D. The Impact of Associational Evidence in the Face of Two Biases 
The current reliance on associational studies may have especially pernicious 
consequences in the face of two biases.  The first is publication bias, which exists when 
researchers are more likely to submit for publication – and journal editors are more likely to 
accept – articles that find statistically significant studies with the “expected” results.  For 
example, the expected result in the case of air pollution and human health is that higher ambient 
concentrations cause increased mortality rates.  The second is regulatory bias, which exists when 
regulators place more weight on studies that find a significant negative health impact of 
emissions than on other studies. 
There is considerable evidence that the epidemiology literature and the economics 
literature both suffer from publication bias [27, 25, 18, 8].  Indeed, the leading medical journals 
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have recently attempted to address publication bias by requiring that all clinical trials be 
registered when they are begun in order to be considered for publication in the journals.  This is 
expected to reduce the bias towards favorable results of treatments because researchers must 
announce their study before knowing the results [52].   
There is further evidence of publication bias with respect to studies of the health effects 
of pollution.  As noted in our discussion of Table I, cross-sectional estimates of the 
health/pollution relationship are not robust and indeed seem equally likely to be positive as 
negative.  If the published papers were a random sample of the results from all estimated 
regressions, one would expect that they would have the same large range as the ones presented 
above.  However, virtually all published papers report a negative relationship between pollution 
and health and this may reflect publication bias.11   
Regulatory bias is also likely.  For example, in their risk analyses, the EPA places greater 
weight on findings from epidemiological studies that find positive associations between 
carcinogenic risks and cancer, than studies that find no association [31].  Similarly, when 
evaluating the risk of methylmercury exposure to pregnant women from fish consumption, the 
National Research Council (NRC) explicitly downgraded a study (from the Republic of the 
Seychelles) that found no such risk.  According to the NRC, “It would not be appropriate to base 
risk-assessment decisions on the Seychelles study because it did not find an association between 
methylmercury and adverse neurodevelopment effects” [64, p. 299].   
Both the EPA and the NRC justify this bias for the sake of protecting public health.  
However, practices that over-estimate public health risk will reduce the ability to achieve 
efficient outcomes.  Even if one assumes that people are risk averse, then regulatory agencies 
should still rely on unbiased estimates of the probability of different outcomes.  Risk aversion is 
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reflected in the willingness-to-pay values that enter the policy benefit calculations.  Perhaps more 
problematic than inefficient over-regulation, the inherent bias towards studies that find health 
effects of pollution can distort our environmental policy priorities [65].  For example, the true 
risk from pollutant A may be greater than the true risk of pollutant B, yet reliance on biased 
empirical studies could lead to more regulatory dollars devoted to the latter pollutant, all other 
things being equal. 
 
II. The Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Approaches 
A. Randomized Experiments 
If traditional regression or associational based evidence is unlikely to allow for the 
identification of important causal relationships in environmental economics, what alternatives 
are available?  The ideal solution to this problem of inference is to run a classical experiment 
where individuals are randomly exposed to a treatment.  Due to random assignment, the 
treatment and control groups should be statistically identical on all dimensions, except exposure 
to the treatment; thus, any differences in outcomes can be ascribed to the treatment.  Put another 
way, with a randomized experiment, it is valid to assume that the selection bias term is zero, so a 
comparison of outcomes among the treatment and control groups yields a credible estimate of the 
average causal effect of exposure to the treatment among the treated.   
The use of randomized experiments in economics is growing rapidly.  The fields of 
development and labor economics have seen a virtual explosion of experiments in the last several 
years [e.g., 55, 53].  In fact, there have been a few experiments in environmental economics in 
the last few years [e.g., 57, 54, 30].  Readers interested in learning more about a number of the 
subtleties in implementing and analyzing randomized experiments are directed to a recent paper 
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by Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer [29]. 
 
B. Quasi-Experimental Approaches 
One of this paper’s primary arguments is that the quasi-experimental approach can be 
used to uncover causal relationships.  In a quasi-experimental evaluation, the researcher exploits 
differences in outcomes between a treatment group and a control group, just as in a classical 
experiment.  In the case of a quasi-experiment, however, treatment status is determined by 
nature, politics, an accident, or some other action beyond the researcher’s control.   
Despite the nonrandom assignment of treatment status, it may still be possible to draw 
valid inferences from the differences in outcomes between the treatment and control groups.  The 
validity of the inference rests on the assumption that assignment to the treatment and control 
groups is not related to other determinants of the outcomes.  In this case, it is not necessary to 
specify and correctly control for all the confounding variables, as is the case with the more 
traditional selection on observables approach.  The remainder of this subsection outlines three 
common quasi-experimental approaches. 
1. Difference in Differences (DD) and Fixed Effects.  This approach exploits the 
availability of panel data that covers at least one period before the assignment of the treatment 
and one period after its assignment.  For clarity, consider a canonical DD example where there 
are two groups or units.  Neither group receives the treatment in the first period and only one 
group receives it in the second period.  The idea is to calculate the change in the outcomes 
among the treated group between the two periods and then subtract the change in outcomes 
among the untreated group.  More formally, this can be expressed as: 
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(5) TDD =  {E[Y1i | Di=1, Pd=2] - E[Y1i | Di=1, Pd=1]} –  
{E[Y0i | Di=0, Pd=2] - E[Y0i | Di=0, Pd=1]}, 
where Pd is an abbreviation for period.  Importantly, all four of these means are observed in the 
data and can readily be estimated.   
 The DD estimator will produce a valid estimate of the treatment effect under the 
assumption that in the absence of the treatment the outcomes in the two groups would have 
changed identically in the treatment and control groups between periods 1 and 2.  More formally, 
this assumption is that  {E[Y0i | Di=1, Pd=2] - E[Y0i | Di=1, Pd=1]} = {E[Y0i | Di=0, Pd=2] - 
E[Y0i | Di=0, Pd=1]}.  This assumption is not trivial and has been shown to be invalid in some 
settings, especially where behavioral responses are possible.  For example, individuals may 
choose to receive the treatment in response to a shock in period 1.12  
By using least squares regression techniques, it is possible to adjust the estimates for 
covariates.  Further, this approach can accommodate multiple time periods and multiple 
treatment groups.  Recent examples of DD and fixed effects estimators in environmental 
economics include Becker and Henderson [12], Greenstone [36], and Deschenes and Greenstone 
[26].13   
2. Instrumental Variables (IV).  An identification strategy based on an instrumental 
variable can solve the selection bias problem outlined above.  The key is to locate an 
instrumental variable, Z, which is correlated with the treatment, but otherwise independent of 
potential outcomes.  The availability of such a variable would allow us to rewrite equation (4) as: 
(4') Tct = Xct′Π + δZct + ηct,  ηct = λc + vct. 
Formally, two sufficient conditions for θIV to provide a consistent estimate of θ are that δ ≠ 0 and 
E[Zctεct]=0.  The first condition requires that the instrument predicts Tct after conditioning on X.  
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The second condition requires that the Z is orthogonal to the unobserved determinants of the 
potential outcomes.14
When this strategy is implemented in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework, it is 
straightforward to understand how this strategy will produce a consistent estimate of θ.  This is 
because the 2SLS approach (which is algebraically identical to the instrumental variable 
approach) estimates equation (4'), then uses the results to obtain a fitted value for T, and replaces 
T in equation (3) with this fitted value.  The intuition is that the instrumental variable discards 
the variation in T that is the source of the selection bias. 
An attractive feature of the IV approach is that it is straightforward to learn about the 
validity of its assumptions.  The first assumption that the instrument is related to the endogenous 
variable can be directly tested.  The second assumption cannot be directly tested, but it is 
possible to learn about the likelihood that it is valid.  One method for doing this is to test for an 
association between the instrument and observable variables measured before the treatment was 
assigned.  If the instrument is unrelated to observable covariates, it may be more likely that the 
unobservables are also orthogonal [2].  Even if this is not the case, this exercise can identify the 
likely sources of confounding and help to inform the choice of a statistical model.  Another 
validity check is to test for an association between the instrument and potential outcomes in a 
period or place where there is no reason for such a relationship.  Additionally, when multiple 
instruments are available one can implement a Wu-Durban-Hausman style overidentification test 
[41]. 
The IV approach has become ubiquitous in applied economics fields and is increasingly 
being used in environmental economics.  Both Chay and Greenstone [21] and Bayer, Keohane 
and Timmins [11] use IV techniques to estimate the capitalization of total suspended particulates 
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into housing prices.   
Finally, we note that there are a host of more subtle issues related to instrumental 
variables methods.  Two especially important issues are the interpretation of IV estimates when 
there is heterogeneity in the treatment effect [48, 42] and the impact of “weak” instruments on 
the unbiasedness of IV estimators [14, 75].  Angrist and Krueger [3] are a good starting point for 
learning more about instrumental variable estimation. 
3. Regression Discontinuity (RD).  The regression discontinuity design is an increasingly 
popular method for solving the problem of selection bias.  In the classic RD design, the 
assignment to the treatment is determined at least partly by the value of an observed covariate 
and whether that value lies on either side of a fixed threshold.  For example, hazardous waste 
sites are eligible for federally sponsored remediation under the Superfund program if a 
continuous measure of site-specific risk exceeds a threshold.  Similarly, counties are designated 
non-attainment under the Clean Air Act if ambient pollution concentrations exceed a threshold.  
The covariate may be associated with potential outcomes either directly or through correlation 
with unobservables; however, this association is assumed to be smooth.  When this assumption is 
valid, a comparison of outcomes at the threshold after conditioning on this covariate or functions 
of this covariate will produce an estimate of the causal effect of the treatment. 
 To make this assumption clear, consider a sharp RD design where assignment of the 
treatment is a deterministic function of one of the covariates.  Define R as this covariate and c as 
the threshold, so the unit is assigned to the treatment when R ≥ c.  The identifying assumption is 
that the distribution functions of Y0 and Y1 conditional on R are continuous at R = c.  Under this 
assumption, 
E[Y0i | R = c] =  E[Ylim
cR↑
0i | R = r] =  E[Ylim
cR↑
0i | Di = 0, R = r] =  E[Ylim
cR↑
i | R = r] 
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and similarly 
E[Y1i | R = c] =  E[Ylim
cR↓
i | R = r]. 
Thus, the selection bias term is zero at R = c (and possibly in some range around c) because 
control units with values of R just below c can be used to form a valid counterfactual for the 
treated units with values of R just above c.  In this case, the average treatment effect at R = c is  
lim
cR↓
 E[Yi | R = r] -  E[Ylim
cR↑
i | R = r]. 
This estimand is the difference of two regression functions at R = c.  It is generally implemented 
by making parametric assumptions about the relationship between Y and R.   
 Much of the appeal of this approach is that, in principle, it offers a rare opportunity to 
know precisely the rule that determines the assignment of the treatment.  In addition to the 
Greenstone and Gallagher [38] paper that uses a RD design to estimate the benefits of Superfund 
remediations, this approach has been implemented in several other settings.  For example, 
Angrist and Lavy [4] examine the impact of class size on student achievement, DiNardo and Lee 
[28] explore the effects of unionization on plant outcomes, Card, Dobkin, and Maestas [17] 
examine the impacts of eligibility for medical services under the Medicare program, and Chay 
and Greenstone [20, 21] use a RD design to assess the benefits of clean air regulations.  As these 
examples illustrate, RD designs are pervasive and can be used to answer a wide range of 
questions.  Their pervasiveness is because administrators frequently use discrete cutoffs for 
program eligibility to ensure that benefits are distributed in a fair and transparent manner.   
 There are a number of subtleties involved with the implementation of RD designs.  One 
immediate issue is whether one is evaluating a “sharp” discontinuity or a “fuzzy” one.  In a sharp 
RD design, the probability of receiving the treatment goes from zero to one at the discontinuity, 
while in a fuzzy one the probability of receiving the treatment changes discontinuously at the 
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threshold but increases by less than one.  Both sharp and fuzzy designs can be used to obtain 
causal estimates of the treatment effect, but there are some differences in implementation and 
interpretation.   
An especially appealing feature of RD designs is that they lend themselves to graphical 
analyses that can display the results in a powerful and easy to understand manner.  In making 
these graphs, researchers face an important set of choices on how to best implement the 
nonparametric regressions that underlie the graphs, including bandwidth choice.  Other issues 
that bear more attention than is feasible to discuss in this paper are how best to implement RD 
estimators, the asymptotic properties of RD estimators, and specification tests.  Imbens and 
Lemieux [49] provide an accessible summary of many of the practical issues associated with the 
implementation of RD designs. 
 Finally, we emphasize that valid RD designs only provide estimates of the average of the 
treatment for the subpopulation where R = c.  To extend the external validity of estimates from 
RD designs, it is necessary to make assumptions (e.g., homogeneity of the treatment effect) that 
may not be justified.  In many situations, however, the estimated treatment effect may be of 
interest in its own right; for example, policymakers may be considering expanding a program so 
that the treatment effect for participants with a value of R slightly less than c is the policy 
relevant treatment effect (rather than the population average treatment effect).  In summary, the 
RD design is frequently an effective method for addressing issues of internal validity, but its 
estimates may have limited external validity. 
 
C. Threats to the Validity of Experiments and Quasi-Experiments and Assessing Their 
Importance 
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There are a series of pitfalls that can undermine the value of experiments and quasi-
experiments.  In their classic work, Cook and Campbell [23] call these pitfalls “threats to 
validity,” where validity is the truth of a proposition or conclusion.15  They divide these into 
threats to internal, external, and construct validity.16  The first applies only to quasi-experiments, 
while the latter two are relevant for randomized experiments and quasi-experiments. 
Internal validity refers to whether it is possible to validly draw the inference that the 
difference in the dependent variables is due to the explanatory variable of interest.  Cook and 
Campbell [23] and Meyer [61] provide exhaustive lists of these threats, but they can largely be 
summarized as instances where treatment status may be related to the post-treatment outcome for 
reasons other than the treatment.17  This could be due to omitted variables, inadequate controls 
for pre-period trends, and/or the selection rule that determines treatment status.  The key feature 
of a threat to internal validity is that it causes the selection bias term in equation (2) to be 
nonzero.  This issue is not a concern in the case of randomized experiments but it is a central 
concern with quasi-experiments. 
External validity is applicable to cases where the treatment effect is heterogeneous and 
refers to whether an experiment’s or quasi-experiment’s results can be generalized to other 
contexts.  People, places, and time are the three major threats to external validity.  For example, 
the individuals in the treatment group may differ from the overall population (perhaps they are 
more sensitive to air pollution) so that the estimated treatment effect is not informative about the 
effect of the treatment in the overall population.  Other examples of cases where external validity 
is compromised are when the estimated treatment effect may differ across geographic or 
institutional settings or if it differs across years (e.g., if in the future a pill is invented that 
protects individuals from air pollution, then the installation of scrubbers would have a different 
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effect on health).18   
An issue that is closely related to external validity is that a treatment’s effect may depend 
on whether it is implemented on a small or large scale.  As an example, consider estimating the 
impact of air pollution on human health when people have sorted themselves into locations of the 
country based on the sensitivity of their health to air pollution.  If the government implements a 
program that improves air quality in some regions, but not others, this may induce individuals to 
change their locations.  The estimated treatment effect that is based on the distribution of the 
population before the re-sorting is likely to differ from the longer run effect of the policy that 
depends on the degree and type of general equilibrium sorting.19  This example underscores that 
the interpretation of a reliable quasi-experimental analysis requires careful economic modeling.   
Finally, construct validity refers to whether the researcher correctly understands the 
nature of the treatment.  Returning to the above example, suppose that scrubbers reduce 
emissions of TSPs and other air pollutants, but the researcher is only aware of the reduction in 
TSPs.  If these other pollutants are important predictors of human health, then a post-adoption 
comparison of human health in the two areas would be unable to separate the effect of TSPs 
from the effect of the other air pollutants.  In this case, the researcher’s inadequate understanding 
of the treatment would cause her to conclude that TSPs affects human health when the effect on 
human health may be due to the reduction of the other pollutants.  Notably, it is still possible to 
obtain unbiased estimates of the overall effect of the new abatement technology—that is, the 
properly understood treatment.  
The prior discussion naturally raises the question of how to find an experiment or quasi-
experiment that sheds light on the question of interest.  The first-order issue in relation to quasi-
experiments is to assess their internal validity.  Unfortunately, there is not a handy recipe or 
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statistical formula that can be taken off the shelf.  Since the treatment in a quasi-experiment is 
not assigned randomly, they are by their very nature messy and lack the sharpness and reliability 
of classical experiments.  Consequently, the keys to a good quasi-experimental design are to be 
watchful (bordering on paranoid) about the threats to its internal validity and to leave no stone 
unturned in testing whether its assumptions are valid.  Although these assumptions cannot be 
tested directly, careful research or “shoe leather” – as the statistician David Freedman calls it – 
can help to understand the source of the variation that determines the explanatory variable of 
interest and assess a quasi-experiment’s validity [33].   
As we discussed in the context of instrumental variables strategies, one informal method 
for assessing the internal validity of a quasi-experiment is to test whether the distributions of the 
observable covariates are balanced across the treatment and control groups.  If the observable 
covariates are balanced, then it may be reasonable to presume that the unobservables are also 
balanced (and that selection bias therefore is not a concern).  A related method of assessing the 
internal validity of a quasi-experiment is to test whether the estimated effect is sensitive to 
changes in specification.  This is particularly relevant for the variables that are not well balanced.  
In the case when all the observables are balanced, it is unnecessary to adjust the treatment effect 
for observables.  Since this is rarely the case, an examination of the sensitivity of the estimated 
treatment effect is an important part of any analysis.   
Of course, the balancing of the observables and/or regression adjustment does not 
guarantee the internal validity of a quasi-experiment.  This is because the unobservables may still 
differ across the treatment and control groups.  Economic reasoning or models can often help to 
identify cases where this is especially likely to be the case.  For example, a thorough 
understanding of the assignment rule might reveal that individuals with a particular characteristic 
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(e.g., high incomes) are more likely to receive the treatment.  Such a finding would undermine 
the credibility of any results.  
A thorough understanding of the experiment or quasi-experimental assignment rule and 
the nature of the treatment can also help to assess the external and construct validity.  For 
example, one might be interested in determining the effect of a nationwide 10% reduction in 
TSPs.  However, the available quasi-experimental evidence on the health effects of TSPs may be 
derived from areas with high TSPs concentrations.  If individuals sort themselves across the 
country based on their susceptibility to TSPs, then these quasi-experimental results may not be 
informative about the health effects in relatively clean areas.  Similarly, if TSPs do not affect 
human health below some concentration, then estimates of the gradient at high concentrations 
will not answer the broader question.  Regarding construct validity, if the treatment (e.g., the 
installation of a scrubber) affects emissions of multiple pollutants then the available quasi-
experimental evidence may be uninformative about the health effects of TSPs. 
These threats to external and construct validity highlight a concern with experiments and 
quasi-experiments.  They are unable to determine the welfare effects of policies that have not 
previously been implemented or to estimate treatment effects for populations that have not 
previously been treated.  Indeed, all empirical studies face these limitations, which can only be 
overcome by relying on theoretical modeling of behavioral relationships in order to make 
predictions under these circumstances.  This type of modeling is frequently necessary to answer 
relevant questions, but the appeal of quasi-experiments (and experiments) is that they make 
transparent which predictions are based on data and which require further assumptions.20
In summary, the appeal of the experimental and quasi-experimental approaches is that 
they rely on transparent variation in the explanatory variable of interest.  The transparency of the 
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variation (or the mere labeling of the variation as quasi-experimental) does not remove concerns 
about threats to validity.  Extensive expenditures of “shoe leather” are necessary to allay these 
concerns.  As Meyer [61] wrote, “If one cannot experimentally control the variation one is using, 
one should understand its source.”  We would add that one must also work to consider the 
appropriate economic model of behavior that is consistent with the quasi-experimental or 
experimental findings. 
 
D. Can the Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Approaches Answer Important Questions? 
In many instances randomized experiments are unavailable to answer questions where 
answers are important.  Further, quasi-experiments are determined by nature, politics, an 
accident, or some other action beyond the researcher’s control.  A key limitation of these 
approaches is that there is no guarantee that these actions will help to inform the most interesting 
or important questions.  Put another way, an exclusive reliance on experimental and quasi-
experimental methods places researchers in the uncomfortable position of relying on nature to set 
their research agendas.  This is frustrating because it raises the possibility that many of the most 
important questions cannot be answered.  One economist expressed this concern, “if applied to 
other areas of empirical work [quasi-experiments] would effectively stop estimation” [47].   
We find this criticism largely unmerited and potentially detrimental to progress in 
understanding the world for at least two reasons.  First, experimental and quasi-experimental 
approaches have been successful in furthering understanding about a number of important topics 
that ex ante might not have seemed amenable to analysis with these methods.  An exhaustive 
listing is beyond the scope of this paper, but one would include quasi-experiments that estimate: 
how cholera is transmitted [74]; the effects of anti-discrimination laws on African-American’s 
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earnings and health outcomes [44, 19, 1]; the labor supply consequences of unemployment 
insurance benefits [60]; the effect of minimum wage laws on employment [15]; the returns to an 
additional year of schooling [9, 16]; the effect of class size on scholastic achievement [4]; the 
effect of pre-kindergarten on test scores [35]; the impact of mandatory disclosure laws on equity 
markets [39]; and individuals’ willingness to pay for school quality [13] and clean air [21]. 
The point is that we believe that a much greater emphasis should be placed on 
implementing experiments and quasi-experiments to answer important environmental economics 
questions.  The successes in implementing these techniques in other areas of economics (notably 
labor, development and public economics) underscore that with sufficient expenditures of “shoe 
leather” it is possible to use them to answer important questions.  In fact, researchers should 
encourage and work with governments to evaluate new policies by implementing randomized or 
quasi-randomized assignments of pilot programs.21   
Our second disagreement with this criticism of experimental and quasi-experimental 
approaches is that it can distract from the main empirical concern of estimating causal 
relationships.  Our view is that empirical research’s value should be based on its credibility in 
recovering the causal relationship of interest.  In contrast to associational studies, the methods we 
have described above place primary emphasis on recovering causal relationships.  If in some 
instances current research is unable to shed much light on the causal relationships of interest, 
then researchers should be clear and transparent about the current state of knowledge (rather than 
treating associational evidence as if it were causal).  This can motivate future researchers to 
uncover causal tests of the relevant hypothesis.22     
 
III. The Costs of the Endangered Species Act: Evidence from North Carolina 
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 We now demonstrate the quasi-experimental approach by assessing the validity of a 
quasi-experiment that aims to evaluate the welfare costs of the Endangered Species Act in North 
Carolina.   
 
A. Introduction 
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (hereafter, the Act) is perhaps the most far-reaching 
environmental statute in the United States, as it makes it unlawful for any private landowner to 
“take” a fish or wildlife species that is designated as endangered by the Department of Interior’s 
Fish and Wildlife Services (for terrestrial and freshwater species) or by the Department of 
Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Fisheries Service (for marine 
species).  In practice, the government defines “take” in a way that places much of the burden of 
species protection on private landowners by restricting opportunities to develop their land.         
Not surprisingly, this onus placed on private landowners makes the Act highly 
controversial, with one side claiming that the burden is too restrictive and the other side claiming 
that the restrictions offer the only effective way to protect species from extinction.  The 
controversy is apparent with respect to many of the Fish and Wildlife Service’s individual 
decisions on which species to list for protection (see, for example, [68]), and manifests itself in 
more general calls for reforming the Act entirely (see, for example, [73] and H.R. 3824 in 2005 
sponsored by Representative Richard Pombo of California).    
Despite all the controversy, relatively little is known about the extent to which species 
protection restricts development and housing supply, resulting in welfare costs.  There is 
certainly the potential for high costs stemming from the ESA given that it places the onus for 
protection primarily on private landowners through restrictions on development.  The potential 
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for high costs also exists because the decision to list a species for protection (at the federal level) 
is to be made “without reference to possible economic or other impacts” (50 CFR 424.11(b)).  In 
1978, the Supreme Court ruled that this language means that the “value of endangered species is 
incalculable,” and a qualified species must be protected “whatever the cost,” and that this 
language “admits no exception” (Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153).23  Even if 
current statutes rule out consideration of the costs, future ones might include them.   
Nonetheless, there are other considerations that might mitigate the welfare costs of 
species protection.  First, some studies have found that landowners preemptively destroy habitat 
in order to avoid ESA repercussions [58, 72], which in addition to diminishing the benefits of 
protection might also serve to mitigate the costs to foregone development.24  Second, 
development restrictions stemming from species protection might serve as a type of zoning 
restriction.  Localities frequently impose land use regulations that can provide public good 
benefits to landowners.  Such landowners might jointly prefer to restrict local development, but 
are individually provided with an incentive to develop.   In effect, the ESA might substitute for 
other land use regulations, thus lessening (or perhaps even eliminating) their regulatory costs 
relative to the counterfactual land use restrictions.   
It is therefore an open empirical question whether – and to what extent – species 
protection restricts development, resulting in costs to landowners, developers, and homebuyers.  
There is, of course, a strong incentive for landowners to overstate the cost of the Act as a means 
to receive statutory relief.  However, there are relatively few empirical studies of its costs.  Some 
studies [e.g., 58] have examined whether the ESA leads to preemptive, cost-avoiding, behavior 
by private landowners.  Other studies [e.g., 76, 59, 78] examine the impacts of the government’s 
designation of some areas as “critical habitats” for protected species.25  To date, the critical 
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habitat designations have only been applied to a subset of protected species; and among the 
species that receive these designations, they are only applied to a subset of their habitats.  
Further, they do not provide any further restrictions beyond those embodied in the ESA.  
Consequently, these studies are only able to provide a partial picture of the ESA’s impacts.   To 
summarize, there are no studies that attempt to provide comprehensive estimates of the welfare 
costs associated with the ESA’s restrictions on development.  
The main empirical complication in addressing this research question is that areas 
containing one or more protected species differ from areas that do not contain such a species, and 
these differences are associated with differences in housing market outcomes.  If these 
differences are unobservable, then a simple regression analysis will lead to biased results.  This 
is the classic selection bias discussed in the first half of the paper. 
In the remainder of this paper we describe a quasi-experiment that has the potential to 
solve the selection problem.  The goal is to highlight the steps involved in identifying a quasi-
experiment and to demonstrate some ways to assess its validity.  Due to space constraints and the 
absence of comprehensive outcomes data, we leave the full-blown estimation of the welfare 
impacts for future research. 
The proposed quasi-experiment is based on a non-profit conservation organization’s 
(NatureServe) assessment of the relative rarity or imperilment of every species present in North 
Carolina.  NatureServe’s assessments are scientifically based and are not based on whether a 
species is protected under the ESA.  Specifically, NatureServe assigns each species to one of the 
following Global Conservation Status Rank (GCSR) categories: Possibly Extinct, Critically 
Imperiled, Imperiled, Vulnerable, Apparently Secure, and Demonstrably Secure.  The key 
feature of this quasi-experiment is that within these ranks there are species that are protected and 
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unprotected by the ESA.  The basis of the analysis is a comparison of housing market outcomes 
in census tracts that include the habitats of protected species to outcomes in census tracts that 
include the habitats of unprotected species of the same Global Conservation Status Rank.  If 
within a GCSR rank, the tracts with the unprotected species are a valid counterfactual for the 
tracts with the protected species, then this quasi-experiment will produce unbiased estimates of 
the impacts of ESA protections.  
 
B. Background on the Endangered Species Act and the Listing Process 
1. Legislative Background.  Quasi-experiments that are based on a law must understand 
the nature of the law.  Here, we describe the workings of the ESA.  The Endangered Species 
Preservation Act of 1966 was the first U.S. statute that aimed systematically to protect 
endangered species.  This legislation was inspired by the plight of the whooping crane.  This law 
was rather limited in scope; its main focus was to authorize the Secretary of Interior to identify 
native fish and wildlife that were threatened with extinction and to allow the Fish and Wildlife 
Service to spend up to $15 million per year to purchase habitat for listed species.  In addition, the 
statute directed federal land agencies to protect these endangered species and their habitats 
“insofar as is practicable and consistent with [the agencies’] primary purpose” (Public Law 89-
669, 80 Stat. 926).  
In 1969, pressured by the growing movement to save the whales, Congress supplemented 
the statute with the Endangered Species Conservation Act, which expanded the protected species 
list to include some invertebrates, authorized the listing of foreign species threatened with 
extinction, and banned the importation of these species except for specified scientific purposes. 
The Endangered Species Act of 1973, which passed in the Senate by a voice vote and in 
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the House of Representatives by a 355-to-4 vote, substantially changed the structure of the law 
on protection of endangered species.  Among other things, the new law distinguished between 
threatened and endangered species, allowed listing of a species that is in danger in just a 
significant portion of its range, extended protection eligibility to all wildlife (including 
invertebrates) and plants, and defined species to include any subspecies or distinct population 
segment of a species.   
 Sections 7 and 9 are the two major components at the heart of the 1973 statute.  Section 
7 requires federal agencies to “consult” with the Secretary of Interior (or the Secretary of 
Commerce for marine species) in order to “insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried 
out by such agency … is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered 
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of 
such species …” (ESA 7(2)).  If the agency action is found to place an endangered or threatened 
species in jeopardy or to result in adverse modification of habitat for the species, the Secretary 
must suggest “reasonable and prudent alternatives” (ESA 7(b)(3)(A)).  While the primary impact 
of this section of the Act is on the actions undertaken on federal lands, it could restrict activities 
on private lands if such activity requires a federal permit.  Importantly, this section of the Act 
applies to both endangered and threatened species and it applies to both animals (fish and 
wildlife) and plants.  
Section 9 most directly impacts private landowners.  It makes it illegal to “take” a listed 
fish or wildlife species, where “take means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect or attempt to engage in any such conduct” (ESA 3(19)).  While this 
prohibition might imply restrictions only on direct physical harm to a species, a landmark 
Supreme Court ruling in 1995 (Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687) deferred to the 
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Department of Interior’s more expansive definition of “take” as “… an act [that] may include 
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife 
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering” 
(50 CFR 17.3).26   
Section 9 is the source of most of the controversy surrounding the Act.  Property rights 
advocates complain that it is highly burdensome and that it violates their Fifth Amendment rights 
on the taking of private property without just compensation.  In contrast, conservationists argue 
that it is the key component for species protection, without which many valued species will be 
lost to extinction.   
The “taking” prohibition listed under section 9 applies only to fish and wildlife species, 
not to plants.  Section 9 does offer some protections for endangered plants, such as restrictions 
on importing and interstate sales, but it does not provide the prohibition on taking plants.  This 
suggests that, all things equal, we should expect smaller (if any) economic impacts for areas that 
contain endangered plants compared to areas that contain endangered animals. 
The “taking” prohibition listed under section 9 applies to endangered species, and not 
necessarily to threatened species.  An endangered species is “any species which is in danger of 
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range ….” (ESA 3(6)), and a threatened 
species is “any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable 
future throughout all or a significant portion of its range” (ESA 3(20)).   
For threatened species, section 4(d) of the Act gives the Secretary of Interior discretion 
on which section 9 prohibitions to apply.  So, for example, the Secretary may exempt a limited 
range of activities from take prohibitions for certain threatened species.  Section 4(d) of the Act 
also allows the Secretary to tailor “protective regulations” that it “deems necessary and advisable 
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to provide for the conservation of [the threatened] species” (ESA 4(d)).  Thus, with respect to 
threatened species, the Fish and Wildlife Service (acting with authority from the Secretary of 
Interior), has greater flexibility about which prohibitions described in section 9 of the Act to 
apply to the species, and which other protective regulations to apply to the species.  This 
flexibility could conceivably result in greater (and thus costlier) protections for threatened 
species, although this is neither the intent nor the implementation of the statute.   
The 1973 Act has been re-authorized eight times and significantly amended three times, 
most recently in 1988.  Among the more significant changes, the 1978 Amendments to the Act 
established a Cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee that can exempt federal actions from 
the prohibitions of section 7.  The 1982 Amendments instituted a permit system that allows the 
“incidental taking” of a listed species provided that the permit holder implements a habitat 
conservation plan for the species.  Nonetheless, the overall framework of the Act has remained 
essentially unchanged since 1973.  The Act was due for reauthorization in 1993, but such 
legislation has not yet been enacted.27     
2. The Listing Process.  Section 4 of the Act requires that the decision to list a species as 
endangered or threatened be based on the following factors: “the present or threatened 
destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; the overutilization for 
commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; disease or predation; the 
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or other natural or manmade factors affecting its 
continued existence” (ESA 4(a)(1)).   
While the listing determination must be made “solely on the basis of the best scientific 
and commercial data available” (ESA 4(b)(1)(A)), the Act does allow some prioritizing in the 
determination process.  That is, the Fish and Wildlife Service can decide that a species warrants 
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inclusion on the list, but that it is “precluded by pending proposals” for other species (ESA 
4(b)(3)(B)).  Species that are deemed as “warranted but precluded” are designated as candidate 
species.  They do not receive the statutory protections of sections 7 and 9, even though the Fish 
and Wildlife Agency believes that they are possibly endangered or threatened.   
     
C. Research Design 
This legislative background and the availability of new data files on species conservation 
statuses and habitats provide an unique opportunity for a quasi-experimental evaluation of the 
economic costs of the ESA.  Specifically, we learned about NatureServe, which is a nonprofit 
conservation organization dedicated to collecting and managing information about thousands of 
rare and endangered species of plants and animals.  As part of their mission, NatureServe 
collects information on the relative imperilment of these species and maps each species’ habitats 
throughout the world.   
The imperilment data is based on scientific criteria and is completely unrelated to ESA 
provisions.  NatureServe summarizes the status of each species with their measure of 
imperilment called Global Conservation Status Rank (GCSR).   The GCSR takes on the 
following values (with the meaning in parentheses):  G1 (Critically Imperiled), G2 (Imperiled), 
G3 (Vulnerable), G4 (Apparently Secure), G5 (Demonstrably Secure), G6 (Unranked), and G7 
(Possibly Extinct).28  Species that are imperiled or vulnerable everywhere they occur have 
GCSRs or G-ranks of G1, G2, or G3. 
The second feature of these data is that they contain detailed GIS maps of the habitats of 
each of the species.  To date, NatureServe has only provided us with habitat data from North 
Carolina, although they have promised to work to provide data from additional states in the 
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future.  We overlaid the North Carolina habitat maps on 2000 census tract boundaries for North 
Carolina to determine the tracts that overlap with each of these species’ habitats.  Notably, the 
NatureServe data on habitats are widely considered to be the most reliable information available.  
For example, the Fish and Wildlife Service often relies on NatureServe habitat maps to 
determine where ESA regulations should apply.   
The key feature of this quasi-experiment is that within GCSRs, there are species that are 
protected and unprotected by the ESA.  The key assumption is that the observed and unobserved 
characteristics of a census tract that make it hospitable for a species may also determine housing 
market outcomes.  Thus, by holding constant GCSRs, it may be possible to avoid confounding 
the impacts of ESA protections with other factors. 
 
D. Theoretical Implications 
The key feature of the ESA is that it removes land from possible development.  Quigley 
and Swoboda [67] present a theoretical model of the welfare costs of species protection, in which 
they assume that residents cannot move outside of the market but can move costlessly within it.  
With respect to the newly regulated land, it is clear that the value of this land should decline, 
especially for undeveloped parcels.  Thus, the decline in the value of this land is a welfare loss.   
Now consider land parcels that are in the same market as the newly regulated land but are 
not subject to ESA restrictions themselves.  The quantity demanded for this land increases, 
leading to an increase in price.  This increase benefits owners of these land parcels, but harms 
consumers/renters.  In the absence of consumer disutility associated with congestion, this 
increase in unregulated land values simply amounts to a transfer from consumers/renters of land 
to owners of land.    
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Finally, the model suggests that, at least in a closed market, there will be overall price 
impacts.  In particular, the reduction in the amount of land available for conversion to housing 
will lead to an increase in land and house prices.  These price increases would reflect a loss of 
welfare to producers and consumers of houses, with the distribution of the losses depending on 
elasticities. 
Due to space constraints and the absence of comprehensive price and quantity data, we 
leave the full-blown estimation of the welfare impacts for future research.  However, we briefly 
note a few empirical predictions.  If the ESA is strictly enforced and does not substitute for other 
land use regulations, we expect that the ESA’s impacts would be most directly felt on land 
parcels that have not yet been converted from some other use (predominantly agriculture) to land 
for housing.  Among these parcels that overlap with newly protected species, we would expect a 
reduction in their value as the option value of converting to housing will be substantially 
reduced.  Further, we expect that fewer of them will be converted to housing, reducing the 
supply of housing.  To investigate these possibilities, we are in negotiations to obtain data on the 
value and conversion of land parcels using US Department of Agricultural data files on land use 
and values.  We are also exploring methods to define local housing markets so that we can test 
for increases in the market-wide price level of houses.      
Finally, we note that data from the decennial population censuses are unlikely to be very 
useful for assessing the impacts of the ESA restrictions.  This is because they are designed to be 
informative about people, not about land.  Consequently, they do not provide information on the 
undeveloped land parcels that are most directly impacted by the legislation.  In fact, this is why 
the Department of Agriculture data are well suited to infer the welfare impacts of ESA 
restrictions.   
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 E. Data Sources 
This subsection details the data that we have collected to date.  They allow for an 
assessment of the validity of our quasi-experiment based on species’ GCSRs.  
NatureServe and ESA Status Data.  The data on species’ habitats comes from 
NatureServe’s Natural Heritage Program.  NatureServe works in partnership with a network of 
74 independent Natural Heritage member programs that gather scientific information on rare 
species and ecosystems in the United States, Latin America, and Canada.  The NatureServe data 
file is so valuable because it has been developed centrally by NatureServe, which ensures that a 
common methodology is used in determining species’ habitats.  It was first initiated in 1974 and 
has been updated regularly since.  
We purchased data on the habitats of all species tracked by NatureServe in North 
Carolina.  The specific data reveal which 2000 census tracts overlap with the current habitat for 
each species.  In the data file that NatureServe provided, there are 1,227 species in North 
Carolina.29  Further, the data file contains the Global Conservation Status Ranks, which as 
discussed above, are an essential component of the quasi-experiment.30   
By supplementing the NatureServe data with information from various issues of the 
Federal Register, we obtained the ESA regulatory status of each of the 1,227 species in North 
Carolina.  Specifically, we determined which of the species fell into the endangered, threatened, 
candidate, and unregulated categories.  Recall, the strictest restrictions apply to areas that include 
the habitats of endangered species and no restrictions apply to areas that encompass the habitats 
of candidate and unregulated species.  
Census Data.  The housing, demographic and economic data come from Geolytics’s 
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Neighborhood Change Database, which includes information from the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 
2000 Censuses.  Here, we focus on the 1990 data to assess whether observable determinants of 
housing market outcomes are balanced in tracts with and without protected species prior to the 
ESA’s designations in the 1990s.  The decennial population census data is critical for assessing 
the validity of the GCSR-based quasi-experiment (even though it does not provide good 
outcomes data for a welfare analysis). 
We use the Geolytics data to form a panel of census tracts based on 2000 census tract 
boundaries, which are drawn so that they include approximately 4,000 people in 2000.  Census 
tracts are the smallest geographic unit that can be matched across the 1970-2000 Censuses.  The 
Census Bureau placed the entire country in tracts in 2000.  Geolytics fit 1970, 1980, and 1990 
census tract data to the year 2000 census tract boundaries to form a panel.  The primary 
limitation of this approach is that in 1970 and 1980, the US Census Bureau only tracted areas 
that were considered “urban” or belonged to a metropolitan area.  The result is that the remaining 
areas of the country cannot be matched to a 2000 census tract, so the 1970 and 1980 values of the 
Census variables are missing for 2000 tracts that include these areas.  
To assess the validity of our quasi-experiment, we use the rich set of covariates available 
in the Geolytics data file.  The baseline covariates are measured at the census tract level and 
include information on housing, economic, and demographic characteristics from the US Census.  
The Data Appendix provides a complete description of these data. 
 Finally, we note that the Geolytics data file is unlikely to be very useful for assessing the 
impacts of the ESA restrictions because it is based on the population census.   Consequently, it 
does not provide information on the undeveloped land parcels directly impacted by the 
legislation.   
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 F. Summary Statistics.   
Table II provides some summary statistics on the species that are present in North 
Carolina.  Panel A reports that there are 1,227 different species tracked by NatureServe in the 
state.  Of these, 408 are animals, 803 are plants, and 16 are fungi.  Each species is assigned a 
Global Conservation Status Rank designated its level of imperilment.  Of the 1,227 species 
present, there are 95 that are critically imperiled, 153 that are imperiled, 250 that are vulnerable, 
328 that are apparently secure, 365 that are secure, 34 that are unranked, and 2 that are possibly 
extinct. 
Panel B in Table II contains information on each species by their ESA regulatory 
designation (endangered, threatened, candidate, or unregulated).  There are 62 species located in 
North Carolina that are designated as either endangered, threatened, or candidate species.  Most 
of these are endangered, and most of the endangered species are animals.  Of the unregulated 
species, more than half are fungi and over thirty percent are animals.  Panel B also shows the 
decade of listing for the endangered, threatened, and candidate species.  Of the endangered 
species, 4 were listed in the 1960s, 9 in the 1970s, 16 in the 1980s, 12 in the 1990s, and 1 in the 
current decade. 
The focus of this quasi-experiment is an evaluation of the assignment of the endangered 
classifications in the 1990s.  Panel C in Table II contains information on the number of census 
tracts that contain species that were designated as endangered, threatened, or candidate in the 
1990s.31  For example, there were 85 census tracts that had an animal designated as endangered 
in the 1990s, and 219 census tracts that had an animal designated as threatened in the 1990s.  
Similarly, there were 97 census tracts that had a plant designated as endangered in the 1990s, and 
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61 census tracts that had a plant designated as threatened in the 1990s.  For each of the 
designation types in the 1990s, Panel C also shows the number of census tracts that contain 
species of different GCSRs.  For example, there are 85 census tracts that had an endangered 
species designated in the 1990s with a GCSR of G1.   
Although North Carolina is just a single state, it is evident that there are hundreds of 
tracts with species covered by the ESA.  Further, there are even more tracts that contain the 
habitats of similarly imperiled species that are not protected by the ESA.  Thus, there is reason 
for some optimism that there will be enough power to detect changes in the outcomes. 
 
G. Assessing the Validity of a Quasi-Experiment Based on GCSRs 
The difficulty in estimating the impact of species protection on property market outcomes 
is that census tracts that did not have a species listed during the decade might not form a suitable 
counterfactual by which to compare the “treated” census tracts that did have a species listed 
during this decade.  Table III provides an opportunity to assess this possibility for the 1990s for 
animal species.  Specifically, column (1) reports on the means of a series of determinants of 
market outcomes measured in 1990 among the 85 census tracts with at least one animal species 
listed as endangered by the ESA during the 1990s.  Column (2) presents the means of these same 
variables among the 1,170 tracts without a single animal species listed as endangered or 
threatened during this period.  Column (3) reports the difference between the columns, as well as 
the heteroskedastic-consistent standard error associated with the difference.  The differences that 
are statistically significant at the five percent level are in bold typeface.   
The entries reveal that the tracts with endangered species differ substantially from tracts 
without them.  For example, 1980 and 1990 mean housing prices are $6,300 and $16,800 dollars 
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higher in the tracts without listed species, respectively.  Further, the population density is much 
higher in these tracts as are the proportion of households headed by a female and the proportion 
of adults with a college degree or higher.  In fact, 19 of the 29 covariates are statistically 
different between the two sets of tracts.  In summary, the areas without an endangered species 
appear to be much more urbanized.  This finding is not terribly surprising since urban 
environments are not hospitable places for animals.  
Column (4) provides an opportunity to assess whether the quasi-experiment helps to 
reduce this confounding.  Specifically, it reports the mean differences (and the heteroskedastic-
consistent standard error) between these two sets of tracts after conditioning on separate 
indicators for each of the GCSRs.  These indicators take on a value of 1 if the tract contains a 
species of the relevant GCSR, regardless of whether the species is protected by the ESA.   
The results are striking.  After conditioning on these indicators, only 3 of the 29 variables 
statistically differ across the two sets of tracts.  For example, the statistically meaningful 
differences in 1980 and 1990 mean housing values, as well as the difference in population 
density, are no longer evident.  Notably, the raw differences have declined substantially so this 
finding is not simply due to the higher standard errors. 
Table IV repeats this analysis for plant species.  The entries in columns (1) and (2) are 
statistically different in 22 of the 29 cases.  In this case, the conditioning on GCSRs again helps 
to mitigate the confounding but it is not as effective as in Table III.  Thus, we have less 
confidence in the validity of the quasi-experiment for plant species.  For this reason and because 
the development restrictions associated with ESA protection of plants are less severe, it seems 
appropriate to analyze the impacts of animal and plant species protections in North Carolina on 
outcomes separately.32
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A threat to internal validity that is not directly examined in Tables III and IV is that for 
reasons unrelated to the ESA there may be differences in local economic shocks between the 
“treatment” and “control” tracts, even within a G-score.  This could occur if, for example, the 
treatment group is disproportionately comprised of tracts in the Western region of North 
Carolina where furniture plants and textile mills dominate, while the control group contains more 
tracts in Eastern North Carolina where there are many pork producers.  We explored this 
possibility by assessing the degree of balance among the covariates in Tables III and IV after 
conditioning on G-Rankings and county fixed effects.  The intuition is that the adjustment for the 
county fixed effects will absorb differences in local economic shocks between the treatment and 
control tracts.   The results reveal that this effort to control for local shocks improves the balance 
between the treatment and control tracts for plants (Table IV) and somewhat worsens it for 
animals (Table III).  In both cases, however, this empirical strategy greatly reduces the 
confounding associated with the unadjusted comparisons (i.e., a comparison of columns 1 and 2 
in Tables III and IV).33   
Overall, this section’s results suggest that the least squares estimation of equation (6) 
without the GCSR indicators may not produce reliable estimates of the impact of the ESA’s 
protection of species on housing prices.  However, the tables provide support for the GCSR 
quasi-experiment for animals but less persuasive evidence for plants.  A full-scale evaluation 
involving data from multiple states is left for future research. 
In the context of this paper’s broader message, this section has demonstrated that 
potentially valid quasi-experiments to solve the vexing problem of selection bias are more 
readily available than may be widely believed.  Further, it has highlighted some ways to judge a 
quasi-experiment’s validity without peeking at data on potential outcomes. 
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 IV. Conclusions 
Environmental economics can help to understand the welfare implications of pollution 
and design optimal policy in response to pollution.  However, the practical importance of this 
contribution rests squarely on the ability of researchers to estimate causal relationships of the 
benefits and costs of emission reductions.  Unfortunately, the traditional associational evidence 
of the benefits and costs of emission reductions can be highly misleading and can therefore lead 
to poor policies.   
In order to advance the field of environmental economics, it is important that researchers 
and policymakers place greater emphasis on credible empirical approaches.  The ideal way to 
achieve this is through a classical experiment in which individuals are randomly selected into 
treatment or control groups.  Recent research suggests that it may be possible to implement 
randomized experiments in more settings than is commonly assumed, but in many instances 
these experiments are not feasible.   
This paper has demonstrated that the quasi-experimental approach can be an appealing 
alternative.  Specifically, it can successfully eliminate selection bias.  The greater application of 
quasi-experimental techniques has the potential to improve our understanding of core 
environmental economics questions.  Ultimately, this may lead to more efficient policies that 




A. NatureServe Data 
 
The following is a subset of the fields contained within the NatureServe data. 
 
Census Tract/Census Block – The U.S. Census Tracts that overlap with each species’ habitat. 
 
Element Code – Unique record identifier for the species that is assigned by the NatureServe central 
database staff.  It consists of a ten-character code that can be used to create relationships between all data 
provided. 
 
Element Global ID - Unique identifier for the species in the Biotics database system; used as the primary 
key. 
 
Global Common Name - The global (i.e., range-wide) common name of an element adopted for use in 
the NatureServe Central Databases (e.g., the common name for Haliaeetus leucocephalus is bald eagle). 
Use of this field is subject to several caveats: common names are not available for all plants; names for 
other groups may be incomplete; many elements have several common names (often in different 
languages); spellings of common names follow no standard conventions and are not systematically edited. 
 
Global Conservation Status Rank - The conservation status of a species from a global (i.e., range-wide) 
perspective, characterizing the relative rarity or imperilment of the species.  The basic global ranks are:  
GX - Presumed Extinct, GH - Possibly Extinct, G1 - Critically Imperiled, G2 – Imperiled, G3 – 
Vulnerable, G4 - Apparently Secure, and G5 – Secure.  For more detailed definitions and additional 
information, please see:  http://www.natureserve.org/explorer/granks.htm. 
 
Global Rank Date - The date on which the Global Conservation Status Rank (GRANK) of an element 
was last reviewed and updated by NatureServe scientists. If an Element Rank is reaffirmed but not 
changed, then the date does not change. 
 
Global Rank Review Date - Date on which the Global Conservation Status Rank (GRANK) was last 
reviewed (i.e., assigned, reaffirmed, or changed) by NatureServe scientists. Note that the Rank Review 
Date is updated each time that a global rank is reviewed, regardless of whether the rank is changed. 
 
Global Scientific Name - The standard global (i.e., range-wide) scientific name (genus and species) 
adopted for use in the Natural Heritage Central Databases based on standard taxonomic references. 
 
Subnation – Abbreviation for the subnational jurisdiction (state or province) where the Element 
Occurrence is located. 
 
U.S. Endangered Species Act Status - Official federal status assigned under the U.S. Endangered 
Species Act of 1973.  Basic USESA status values include:  LE – Listed endangered, LT - Listed 
threatened, PE - Proposed endangered, PT – Proposed threatened, C – Candidate, PDL - Proposed for 
delisting, LE(S/A) – Listed endangered because of similarity of appearance, LT(S/A) - Listed threatened 
because of similarity of appearance, XE - Essential experimental population, XN - Nonessential 
experimental population. For additional information about how NatureServe manages US ESA status 
information, please see: http://www.natureserve.org/explorer/statusus.htm
 
U.S. Endangered Species Act Status Date - The date of publication in the Federal Register of 
notification of an official status for a taxon or population.  Dates appear only for taxa and populations that 
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are specifically named under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. 
 
B. Geolytics Census Data 
 
The following are the covariates used to assess the validity of the quasi-experiment based on GCSRs and 
data on species habitats.  All of the variables are measured in 1990 and are measured at the census tract 
level. 
 
1990 Ln House Price 
ln median value of owner occupied housing units in 1990 
 
1990 Housing Characteristics 
total housing units (rental and owner occupied); % of total housing units (rental and owner occupied) that 
are occupied; total housing units owner occupied; % of owner occupied housing units with 0 bedrooms; 
% of owner occupied housing units with 1 bedroom; % of owner occupied housing units with 2 
bedrooms; % of owner occupied housing units with 3 bedrooms; % of owner occupied housing units with 
4 bedrooms; % of owner occupied housing units with 5 or more bedrooms; % of owner occupied housing 
units that are detached; % of owner occupied housing units that are attached; % of owner occupied 
housing units that are mobile homes; % of owner occupied housing units built within last year; % of 
owner occupied housing units built 2 to 5 years ago; % of owner occupied housing units built 6 to 10 
years ago; % of owner occupied housing units built 10 to 20 years ago; % of owner occupied housing 
units built 20 to 30 years ago; % of owner occupied housing units built 30 to 40 years ago; % of owner 
occupied housing units built more than 40 years ago; % of all housing units without a full kitchen; % of 
all housing units that have no heating or rely on a fire, stove, or portable heater; % of all housing units 
without air conditioning; % of all housing units without a full bathroom 
 
1990 Economic Conditions 
mean household income; % of households with income below poverty line; unemployment rate; % of 
households that receive some form of public assistance 
 
1990 Demographics
population density; % of population Black; % of population Hispanic; % of population under age 18; % 
of population 65 or older; % of population foreign born; % of households headed by females; % of 
households residing in same house as 5 years ago; % of individuals aged 16-19 that are high school 
dropouts; % of population over 25 that failed to complete high school; % of population over 25 that have 
a BA or better (i.e., at least 16 years of education) 
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Table I: Cross-Sectional Estimates of the Association between Mean TSPs and Infant Deaths Due to Internal Causes 
per 100,000 Live Births (estimated standard errors in parentheses) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
1969 Cross-Section 2.48 -0.14 0.20 
 (0.92) (0.38) (0.41) 
 [412,.05] [357,.69] [357,.75] 
    
1970 Cross-Section 1.30 0.26 -0.07 
 (0.72) (0.28) (0.24) 
 [501,.02] [441,.60] [441,.67] 
    
1971 Cross-Section 1.59 -0.05 0.75 
 (0.98) (0.44) (0.47) 
 [501,.02] [460,.62] [460,.68] 
    
1972 Cross-Section 0.89 -1.32 -1.82 
 (1.20) (0.65) (0.87) 
 [501,.00] [455,.48] [455,.57] 
    
1973 Cross-Section 2.51 -1.06 0.41 
 (1.52) (0.79) (0.81) 
 [495,.02] [454,.59] [454,.66] 
    
1974 Cross-Section 2.88 1.01 2.04 
 (1.34) (0.67) (0.80) 
 [489,.03] [455,.61] [455,.68] 
    
1969-1974 Pooled 2.54 0.16 0.22 
 (0.84) (0.22) (0.20) 
 [2899,.04] [2622,.58] [2622,.61] 
    
    
Basic Natality Vars. N Y Y 
Unrestricted Natality N Y Y 
Income, Employment N Y Y 
Income Assist. Sources N Y Y 
State Effects N N Y 
Notes: Numbers in brackets are the number of counties and R-squareds of the regressions, respectively.  The 
potential sample is limited to the 501 counties with TSPs data in 1970, 1971 and 1972.  In a given year, the sample 
is further restricted to counties with nonmissing covariates.  Sampling errors are estimated using the Eicker-White 
formula to correct for heteroskedasticity.  The sampling errors in the “1969-1974 Pooled” row are also corrected for 
county-level clustering in the residuals over time.  Regressions are weighted by numbers of births in each county.  
Internal causes of death arise from common health problems, such as respiratory and cardiopulmonary deaths.  The 
control variables are listed in the Data Appendix and in Table I.  State Effects are separate indicator variables for 
each state.  Bold text indicates that the null hypothesis that the estimate is equal to zero can be rejected at the 5% 
level.  See the text and Chay and Greenstone [20] for further details. 
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Table II: Summary Statistics of NatureServe's North Carolina Species Data     
A. Full NatureServe Species Information 
# of NatureServe Species 1,227    
      
Kingdom     
Animalia 408    
Plantae 803    
Fungi 16    
     
Global Conservation Status Rank      
G1 (Critically Imperiled) 95    
G2 (Imperiled) 153    
G3 (Vulnerable) 250    
G4 (Apparently Secure) 328    
G5 (Secure) 365    
G6 (Unranked) 34    
G7 (Possibly Extinct) 2     
B. Listed Species Information 
  Endangered Threatened Candidate Unregulated
 Species Species Species Species
# of Species for Each Designation 42 16 4 1,165 
     
Kingdom     
Animalia 24 7 1 376 
Plantae 17 9 3 15 
Fungi 1 0 0 774 
      
Informal Taxonomic Group     
    Animalia:        
        Amphibians 0 0 0 27 
        Amphipods 0 0 0 1 
        Birds 3 1 0 47 
        Butterflies and Skippers 1 0 0 35 
        Caddisflies 0 0 0 13 
        Crayfishes  0 0 0 13 
        Crocodilians 0 1 0 0 
        Dragonflies and Damselflies 0 0 0 11 
        Fishes 2 2 1 56 
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        Freshwater Mussels 7 0 0 34 
        Freshwater Snails 0 0 0 8 
        Giant Silkworms 0 0 0 1 
        Grasshoppers 0 0 0 4 
        Isopods 0 0 0 1 
        Mammals 6 0 0 21 
        Mayflies 0 0 0 12 
        Other Beetles 0 0 0 1 
        Other Crustaceans 0 0 0 2 
        Other Insects 0 0 0 2 
        Other Molluscs 0 0 0 1 
        Other Moths 0 0 0 24 
        Papaipema Moths 0 0 0 1 
        Reptiles 0 0 0 13 
        Spiders 1 0 0 4 
        Stoneflies 0 0 0 6 
        Terrestrial Snails 0 1 0 26 
        Tiger Moths  0 0 0 2 
        Turtles 4 2 0 5 
        Underwing Moths 0 0 0 5 
    Plantae:        
        Conifers and Relatives 0 0 0 2 
        Ferns and Relatives 0 0 0 33 
        Flowering Plants 17 9 3 559 
        Hornworts 0 0 0 2 
        Liverworts 0 0 0 61 
        Mosses 0 0 0 117 
    Fungi:        
        Lichens 1 0 0 15 
     
Global Conservation Status Rank     
G1 (Critically Imperiled) 14 4 2 75 
G2 (Imperiled) 19 6 2 126 
G3 (Vulnerable) 9 4 0 238 
G4 (Apparently Secure) 1 0 0 327 
G5 (Secure) 0 2 0 363 
G6 (Unranked) 0 0 0 34 
G7 (Possibly Extinct) 0 0 0 2 
     
 50
Decade of Listing     
1960s 4 0 0  
1970s 9 3 0  
1980s 16 7 1  
1990s 12 6 2  
2000s 1 0 1  
C. Census Tract Species Information 
# of Tracts without a NatureServe Species 41    
# of Tracts with a NatureServe Species 1,522    
      
    # of Tracts with
 # of Tracts with # of Tracts with # of Tracts with No 1990s Listed
 1990s Endangered 1990s Threatened 1990s Candidate Species, but with
 Species that are … Species that are … Species that are …  Species that are …
Kingdom         
Animalia 85 219 0 1,449 
Plantae 97 61 28 1,170 
Fungi 31 0 0 57 
         
Global Conservation Status Rank     
G1 (Critically Imperiled) 85 0 2 253 
G2 (Imperiled) 65 61 28 633 
G3 (Vulnerable) 50 81 0 1,012 
G4 (Apparently Secure) 0 0 0 1,420 
G5 (Secure) 0 141 0 944 
G6 (Unranked) 0 0 0 287 
G7 (Possibly Extinct) 0 0 0 3 
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Table III: Census Tract Summary Statistics for Treatment and Control Groups (Animals)   
    Difference 
 (T) (C)   Conditional 
 
1 or More 
Endangered 
Species  
No Species Listed 







Species in 1990s 
(robust 
SEs) (robust SEs) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of Census Tracts 85 1,170    
       
1980 Housing Characteristics      
Mean Housing Value 24,790 31,048 -6,258 -511.7 
   (3,035) (3,336) 
1990 Housing Characteristics      
Median Housing Value 57,835 61,797 -3,962 -3,821 
   (2,955) (4,528) 
Mean Housing Value 42,948 59,750 -16,802 -2,027 
   (3,137) (3,706) 
Proportion Mobile Homes 0.217 0.122 0.094 0.016 
   (0.011) (0.015) 
Proportion Occupied 0.857 0.912 -0.054 0.018 
   (0.013) (0.020) 
Proportion Owner-Occupied 0.648 0.602 0.046 0.035 
   (0.016) (0.023) 
Proportion with 0 to 2 Bedrooms 0.357 0.423 -0.065 -0.049 
   (0.010) (0.015) 
Proportion with 3 to 4 Bedrooms 0.620 0.556 0.064 0.047 
   (0.010) (0.014) 
Proportion with 5 Plus Bedrooms 0.023 0.021 0.002 0.002 
   (0.003) (0.464) 
Proportion with No Full Kitchen 0.021 0.011 0.010 0.002 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Proportion Attached 0.013 0.027 -0.014 -0.001 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
Proportion Detached 0.701 0.664 0.037 0.029 
   (0.013) (0.018) 
1990 Demographic Characteristics      
Population Density (100k per sq. m.) 9.760 44.270 -34.510 -7.700 
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   (2.740) (4.740) 
Proportion Black 0.186 0.231 -0.045 -0.003 
   (0.024) (0.029) 
Proportion Hispanic 0.008 0.010 -0.002 0.001 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Proportion under 18 0.246 0.239 0.006 0.011 
   (0.005) (0.006) 
Proportion 65 or Older 0.136 0.125 0.010 -0.008 
   (0.006) (0.008) 
Proportion Foreign Born 0.009 0.019 -0.010 -0.003 
   (0.001) (0.002) 
Proportion of HHs Headed by a Female 0.202 0.247 -0.045 -0.018 
   (0.013) (0.018) 
Proportion in Same House in Last 5 Years 0.601 0.534 0.067 0.013 
   (0.013) (0.016) 
Proportion HS Dropouts 0.142 0.134 0.008 0.016 
   (0.009) (0.012) 
Proportion No HS 0.181 0.173 0.007 -0.012 
   (0.006) (0.008) 
Proportion with BA or Better 0.124 0.185 -0.061 -0.017 
   (0.010) (0.015) 
Species Listed in 1980s 0.271 0.050 0.220 -0.187 
   (0.049) (0.066) 
Species Listed in 1970s 0.318 0.150 0.167 0.010 
   (0.052) (0.065) 
1990 Economic Characteristics      
Mean HH Income 29,921 33,580 -3,659 36 
   (1,274) (1369) 
Proportion below Povery Level 0.152 0.134 0.018 0.004 
   (0.010) (0.012) 
Proportion on Public Assistance 0.087 0.071 0.016 0.015 
   (0.006) (0.008) 
Unemployment Rate 0.057 0.051 0.006 0.007 
      (0.004) (0.004) 
Notes: See the text for details.     
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Table IV: Census Tract Summary Statistics for Treatment and Control Groups (Plants)   
    Difference 
 (T) (C)   Conditional 
 1 or More Endangered Species No Species Listed as Endangered or Difference on G-Rankings 
 Listed in 1990s Threatened Species in 1990s (robust SEs) (robust SEs) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of Census Tracts 97 1,026    
      
1980 Housing Characteristics      
Mean Housing Value 25,493 30,054 -4,560 -3,698 
   (1,798) (1,864) 
1990 Housing Characteristics      
Median Housing Value 54,109 62,521 -8,414 -7,379 
   (2,079) (2,372) 
Mean Housing Value 43,125 58,188 -15,063 -27,763 
   (2,532) (2,079) 
Proportion Mobile Homes 0.202 0.143 0.059 -0.006 
   (0.011) (0.013) 
Proportion Occupied 0.869 0.908 -0.039 -0.005 
   (0.012) (0.011) 
Proportion Owner-Occupied 0.683 0.621 0.062 0.050 
   (0.015) (0.016) 
Proportion with 0 to 2 Bedrooms 0.365 0.406 -0.040 -0.014 
   (0.010) (0.011) 
Proportion with 3 to 4 Bedrooms 0.615 0.573 0.042 0.016 
   (0.010) (0.011) 
Proportion with 5 Plus Bedrooms 0.019 0.022 -0.002 -0.002 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Proportion with No Full Kitchen 0.016 0.013 0.003 0.003 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Proportion Attached 0.012 0.025 -0.013 -0.007 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
Proportion Detached 0.722 0.673 0.049 0.048 
   (0.012) (0.013) 
1990 Demographic Characteristics      
Population Density (100k per sq. m.) 6.350 36.150 -29.800 -14.670 
   (1.760) (2.230) 
-0.022 Proportion Black 0.155 0.217 -0.063 
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   (0.022) (0.022) 
Proportion Hispanic 0.007 0.009 -0.003 -0.004 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Proportion under 18 0.246 0.241 0.005 0.004 
   (0.004) (0.004) 
Proportion 65 or Older 0.132 0.124 0.008 0.005 
   (0.005) (0.006) 
Proportion Foreign Born 0.011 0.017 -0.006 -0.006 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
Proportion of HHs Headed by a Female 0.175 0.235 -0.060 -0.034 
   (0.011) (0.012) 
Proportion in Same House in Last 5 Years 0.612 0.543 0.069 0.051 
   (0.012) (0.013) 
0.022 Proportion HS Dropouts 0.148 0.134 0.014 
   (0.009) (0.009) 
Proportion No HS 0.197 0.173 0.024 0.024 
   (0.006) (0.006) 
Proportion with BA or Better 0.118 0.185 -0.067 -0.052 
   (0.010) (0.012) 
Species Listed in 1980s 0.155 0.048 0.107 0.009 
   (0.037) (0.039) 
Species Listed in 1970s 0.000 0.006 -0.006 -0.016 
   (0.002) (0.007) 
1990 Economic Characteristics      
Mean HH Income 30,957 33,386 -2,429 -619 
   (2,429) (970) 
-0.023 Proportion below Poverty Level 0.124 0.137 -0.013 
   (0.008) (0.008) 
Proportion on Public Assistance 0.065 0.072 -0.006 -0.009 
   (0.004) (0.005) 
Unemployment Rate 0.044 0.052 -0.008 -0.012 
      (0.003) (0.003) 
Notes: See the text for details.     
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A [0] C [0]B [1]B [0]A [1] C [1]
                   
Notes: All dollar values are in 2002 constant dollars.  Each of the 36 lines represents an estimate of the impact of increases of 5 degrees Fahrenheit and 8% 
precipitation due to climate change on agricultural land values in the US.  The midpoint of each line is the point estimate and the top and bottom of the lines are 
calculated as the point estimate plus and minus one standard error of the predicted impact, respectively.  The A, B, and C panels correspond to three sets of 
control variables.  In the A columns, the climate variables (i.e., temperature and precipitation) are the only regressors.  The entries in the B panels are adjusted for 
soil characteristics, as well as per capita income and population density and their squares.  The specification associated with the C panels adds state fixed effects 
to the B specification.  Among the A, B, and C panels, the panel “[0]” regression equations are unweighted and the panel “[1]” entries are the result of weighting 
by the square root of acres of farmland.  Within each of the six panels, the lines report the estimated impact from estimating the relevant model on data from one 
of the 6 years indicated on the x-axis.  See the text and Deschenes and Greenstone [26] for further details (including a list of the exact covariates).  
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1 For a formal analysis of the inefficiency caused by externalities, see Baumol and Oates [10] or Cropper and Oates 
[24]. 
2 See Gayer and Horowitz [34] for a discussion of design issues for policy instruments. 
3 We use the terms “pollution” or “emissions” broadly to mean reductions in environmental quality.  They include 
externalities due to such things as over-fishing, deforestation, and species extinction. 
4 This definition of causality is certainly not original.  Philosophers in the 19th century used similar definitions.  For 
example, John Stuart Mill [62] wrote: “If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs, and an 
instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring in the former: 
the circumstances in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or a necessary part of the cause 
of the phenomenon.” 
5 See Freedman [33] for a criticism of the regression approach to testing causal propositions.  
6 One potential solution for dealing with omitted variables problems is to use a fixed effects model that removes all 
permanent determinants of mortality as potential sources of bias.  However, the cost of this approach can be quite 
steep because fixed effects are likely to exacerbate the attenuation bias due to mismeasurement.  This is because in 
the fixed effects case, the magnitude of the attenuation bias also depends on the correlation across years in the “true” 
measure of air pollution.  Specifically, a high correlation in the “true” year to year values of air pollution greatly 
exacerbates the attenuation bias.  It is reasonable to assume a county's true air pollution concentrations are highly 
correlated across years.  So, although fixed effects remove permanent unobserved factors as a source of bias, it is 
likely to exacerbate the attenuation bias due to measurement error.  
7 See Angrist and Lavy [4] and Rubin [71] for applications. 
8 See Greenstone [37] for an application in environmental economics. 
9 “Internal” and “external” deaths span all possible causes of death.  Deaths with 9th International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD) codes from 001 to 799 are classified as internal, while those with ICD codes from 800 to 999 are in 
the external category. 
10 The control variables included in each specification are listed in the Data Appendix of Chay and Greenstone [20]. 
11 The presence of publication bias would also imply that the findings of meta-analyses of published papers are 
unlikely to produce reliable results. 
12 The tendency for individuals that have received a negative labor market shock to sign up for job training programs 
is a particularly well known example that is often referred to as the “Ashenfelter [pre-program earnings] dip” and 
makes it extremely difficult to estimate the impact of training programs in the absence of experimental or quasi-
experimental variation in program participation [6, 7]. 
13 Angrist and Krueger [3] provide a more extensive treatment of the DD and fixed effects approaches. 
14 More precisely, the requirement is that (Z-E(Z|X)) is orthogonal to the unobserved components of potential 
outcomes. 
15 These “threats to validity” apply to all empirical studies, but this subsection discusses them in the context of 
quasi-experiments. 
16 This subsection draws on Cook and Campbell [23] and Meyer [61]. 
17 Other threats to internal validity include misspecified variances that lead to biased standard errors, sample 
attrition, and changes in data collection that cause changes in the measured variables. 
18 See Imbens and Angrist [48] and Heckman and Vytlacil [45] on the interpretation of instrumental variables 
estimates in the presence of heterogeneous responses. 
19 See Heckman, Lochner, and Taber [43] on estimating general equilibrium treatment effects. 
20 See Keane [50] for the vigorous expression of an alternative viewpoint. 
21 One frequent criticism of randomized evaluations of policies is that it is unethical to deny some members of the 
population the treatment.  We do not find this argument compelling when the treatment effect is unknown, which is 
often the case.  Moreover, the limited set of resources available for many environmental programs means that 
treatments in environmental programs may be assigned on the basis of political concerns that are not welfare 
enhancing.  For example, Viscusi and Hamilton [77] claim that political criteria impact Superfund decisions such 
that “Superfund expenditures do not fare well when evaluated in terms of cancer protection” [77, p. 1012].    
22 Policymakers can also improve the dissemination of whether a causal relationship is reliably estimated.  For 
example, within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) is charged with overseeing the regulatory process.  Under Executive Order 12866, OIRA verifies that each 
major regulation has benefits that “justify” its costs.  OIRA recently published guidelines to the agencies on how to 
conduct cost-benefit analyses [66].  It would be a relatively simple task for the guidelines to place more emphasis on 
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experimental and quasi-experimental studies and to include criteria for assessing the validity of associational studies.  
Efforts like these would spur researchers to present meaningful tests of validity and in an ideal world the candor 
would strengthen scientists’ credibility with policymakers in future interactions. 
23 See Ferraro, McIntosh and Ospina [32] for an analysis of the ESA’s effectiveness at protecting species.  They find 
mixed evidence on the legislation’s effectiveness although like all other work on this question they do not have 
access to a time series of population counts and must rely on the qualitative outcome “change in endangerment 
status” between 1993 and 2004. 
24 Preemptive habitat destruction constitutes a change in land management decisions in order to avoid potential 
endangered species problems.  As such, it is not a violation of the law.  Indeed the National Association of Home 
Builders [63] stated in one of its guidance documents, “Unfortunately, the highest level of assurance that a property 
owner will not face an ESA issue is to maintain the property in a condition such that protected species cannot 
occupy the property.  Agricultural farming, denuding of property, and managing the vegetation in ways that prevent 
the presence of such species are often employed in areas where ESA conflicts are known to occur.”  Of course, there 
is also the concern that the ESA provides incentives for illegally destroying protected species or habitats, a practice 
referred to as “shoot, shovel, and shut up”. 
25 A critical habitat is a formally-designated geographic area, whether occupied by a protected species or not, that is 
considered to be essential for a given protected species’ conservation.  These designations are required by law; 
however, in practice, due to a lack of information, of resources, and of any additional statutory protection they 
provide to species, the government has frequently failed to make such designations. 
26 The Supreme Court decision upholding this definition was a six-to-three vote.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice 
Antonin Scalia argued that “the Court’s holding that the hunting and killing prohibition incidentally preserves 
habitat on private lands imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin – not just upon the rich, but upon the 
simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national zoological use.” 
27 Former Representative Richard Pombo of California proposed H.R. 3824 in 2005, which passed the House of 
Representatives by a 229-to-193 vote.  The bill attempts to overhaul the Act.  However, the Senate did not consider 
the bill, and its near-term prospects are doubtful. 
28 For more information on the measure, see http://www.natureserve.org/explorer/granks.htm. 
29 In maintaining its database, NatureServe devotes the most resources to accurately tracking the habitats of the 
species that are imperiled or vulnerable everywhere they occur, which are the species with ranks of G1, G2, and G3.   
These resource allocation decisions are unaffected by whether a species is protected under the ESA and are instead 
based on NatureServe’s assessment of the level of imperilment. 
30 Currently, we only have access to each species’ most recent G-rank.  Although G-ranks change infrequently, it is 
possible that the G-ranks in our data file differ from those that applied for some species in 1990.  For this reason, it 
is especially important that we chose to base the quasi-experiment on species’ global status or G-rank, rather than 
the national or sub-national ranks which are also available from NatureServe.  Specifically, the global ranks are an 
“assessment of the condition of the species or ecological community across its entire range.” (see 
http://www.natureserve.org/explorer/ranking.htm)  In contrast, the national or sub-national ranks document a 
species’ condition nationally or at the sub-national (primarily states) level.  The most recent national or sub-national 
ranks may reflect the impact of the ESA during the 1990s.  It is unlikely that the G-ranks would reflect the ESA’s 
impacts.  Nevertheless, we are working to obtain the full history of global, national, and sub-national ranks from 
NatureServe and will use them in our full evaluation of the ESA. 
31 A tract is coded as containing a species if there is any overlap between the species’ habitat and the tract’s 
“footprint”.  Consequently, an entire tract is considered part of a species’ habitat even if the species’ habitat only 
partially overlaps the tract’s ‘footprint’. 
32 In a separate unreported analysis, we defined the treatment as those census tracts that contained only one species 
listed as endangered in the 1990s.  This further restriction on the treatment definition did not materially alter any 
results. 
33 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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